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Damages in Libel 
R. F. V . H E U S T O N 
A W Y E R S notice that laymen are interested in libel. People 
are also interested in money. So it is not surprising that 
* * there should be particular interest in the question of 
damages in an action for libel. How much is an injured reputation 
worth in hard cash ? 
This is what lawyers call a jury question — i.e., one to be 
answered by twelve ordinary citizens in the jury box under direc-
tion from the judge. It is possible, but unusual, for a libel case to be 
tried by a judge sitting alone. Most judges dislike this and prefer 
to share their responsibilities with a jury. Indeed this is a field in 
which lawyers are apt to feel hurt that their efforts are mis-
understood by laymen. The law says that the constitutional 
tribunal for deciding the amount of damages to be paid by a 
person who says false things about his neighbour is a jury 
representing the public, who can by their award show what they 
think of the defendant's conduct. Almost the only rule is, or was, 
that the award must be reasonable. When the layman asks 'what 
is reasonable?' the lawyer replies, 'That is for you to say. It is 
fact, not law'. A l l matters relating to the mode of publication, 
the circumstances of the parties, and the conduct of the defence, 
can be considered. There is old authority for saying that a jury is 
entitled to consider not only what the plaintiff ought to receive but 
what the defendant ought to pay. Further, although the plain-
tiff's hurt feelings, as distinct from his loss of reputation, are not 
the primary object of compensation, damages may still be given 
for them once it has been shown that some reputation has been 
lost. As Tennyson put it in 'Locksley Hall ' : 
But the jingling of the guinea helps the hurt that Honour feels. 
Generally, however, the plaintiff wrants more than guineas — 
he wants guineas which are paid by the defendant. Most plaintiffs 
would feel vaguely aggrieved if some benevolent friend of the 
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defendant rather than the defendant himself paid the sum awarded. 
The House of Lords has recognized this human weakness. It has 
said that the damages awarded to a plaintiff by a judge sitting 
alone should not be reduced by reason of the fact that the judge 
unlike a jury has been able in his judgment to say pleasant 
things about the plaintiff or hard things about the defendant. 
Compliments even from the bench are no substitute for cash. 
The latitude which the law allows to juries in their assessment is 
remarkable. The vagueness which surrounds the whole subject is 
well shown by a case in which the Court of Appeal ordered a new 
trial on the ground that the award of £ 1 , 0 0 0 was excessive. It was 
claimed that the jury has been annoyed by the attitude of the 
defendants and in particular by the way in which their counsel, 
F. E . Smith, K . C . , had conducted their case. Lord Justice I Iamilton 
said: 
Still, in my opinion by no formula or manipulation can £ 1 , 0 0 0 be got 
at. For any damage really done, £ 1 0 0 was quite enough; double it for 
the sympathy; double it again for the jury's sense of the defendants' 
conduct, and again for their sense of Mr. F. E. Smith's. The product is 
only £ 8 0 0 . 1 
One incidental result of this liberty enjoyed by juries is that the 
Court of Appeal is or was very reluctant to order a new trial on 
damages, for what is it to do if the second jury awards a sum 
similar to that given by the first? Even when the Court thinks 
that the award is manifestly excessive, it cannot substitute its own 
figure for the jury's, as it can in actions for personal injuries. It 
must order a new trial. 
Recent cases have stressed the need for two virtues — modera-
tion, and uniformity. Moderation has been emphasized in a 
number of cases involving newspaper defendants — in particular, 
Lewis v . Daily Telegraph2, in which the House of Lords set aside 
awards totalling £ 2 1 7 , 0 0 0 . There is a curious paradox here. In 
the eighteenth century it was juries who were anxious to maintain 
the freedom of the Press and judges who were anxious to restrict 
it. In the twentieth century it is the jury which seems determined 
to make the Press pay heavily for libel, and judges who are 
anxious to keep awards within limits. 
1 [ '9 T 3l 3 K - B - 764-
2 [1964] A . C . 2 3 4 . 
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Uniformity has two aspects. First, the Court of Appeal has 
tried to ensure that awards in libel cases are roughly comparable 
to those in personal injury cases. The law has not, it has been 
asserted, got a different scale of values for reputations and for 
limbs. So that if for loss of a limb £10,000 was awarded, which 
would be roughly the current scale, it would need a serious attack 
on the plaintiff's reputation before a similar award was permissible 
in a libel case. This sounds attractive. Everybody likes to feel that 
like cases are being treated alike. But this attempt at uniformity 
makes the assumption that the legal scale of values for personal 
injuries is itself correct. Many people would question this and 
argue that the scale is too low. 
Secondly, the courts now stress the fact that damages are 
intended only to compensate the plaintiff for that which he has 
lost. So in the field of personal injuries this has produced a series 
of cases holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to collateral 
benefits or windfalls: they must be deducted from any damages 
awarded. So it is logical for the law to exclude the largest windfall 
of all — punitive or exemplary damages, for they are frankly 
given not to compensate the plaintiff but in order to punish the 
defendant and to deter him and others of like mind from com-
mitting similar conduct in the future. 
This is a topic on which judicial opinions have varied in an 
interesting way. In Loudon v. Ryder1 Lord Devlin, then Devlin J . , 
of the Queen's Bench Division, told a jury in an action for assault 
and trespass that they were entitled to award a sum which would 
not only compensate the plaintiff, a young lady, for an un-
pleasant experience, but also punish the defendant for his dis-
graceful and outrageous invasion of the plaintiff's privacy. The 
jury accepted the invitation and returned a verdict for £5,500, of 
which £3,000 was specifically stated to be punitive damages. 
The Court of Appeal, after some hesitation, refused to interfere. 
There was certainly some authority to support such awards in 
cases of trespass and assault. In such a case in 1814 Gibbs C.J., 
asked, T wish to know, in a case where a man disregards every 
principle which actuates the conduct of gentlemen, what is to 
restrain him except large damages'?2 Perhaps that has a rather 
1 t 1 95 Si 2 Q.B- 2 ° 2 ' 
2 Merest v . Harvey (1814) 5 Taunt. 442. 
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old-fashioned sound today. In Loudon v. Ryder a bystander told 
the defendant that 'he had no business to be doing things like 
that in England', and this remark was quoted approvingly by 
Denning L . J . , in the Court of Appeal. But it is a curious fact that 
although the textbooks all assume that punitive damages may be 
awarded in libel there is no clear reported decision, as distinct 
from emphatic dicta,1 to this effect. Perhaps the nearest decision is 
Youssoupoff v. M.G.M. Lid,2 in which the Court of Appeal upheld 
an award of £25,000 against the defendant company for a cruel 
and widely circulated libel. The Court said that the jury were 
entitled to take into account the fact that the defendants had 
expressly refused to withdraw the film pending trial on the ground 
that if they did so they might lose profits amounting to £40,000. 
Such an award reminds one of a rather rhetorical passage in an 
American decision: 
If the courts will only let the verdicts of upright and intelligent juries 
alone, and let the doctrine of exemplary damages have its legitimate 
influence, we predict that these great and growing evils will be very 
much lessened, if not entirely cured. There is but one vulnerable point 
about these ideal existences called corporations ; and that is, the pocket 
of the money power that is concealed behind them; and if that is 
reached they will wince.3 
But in 1964 in the famous trade union case of Rookes v. Barnard* 
Lord Devlin took a different view and the other four Law Lords 
agreed with him. Lord Devlin thought it was wrong for the 
defendant to be obliged to pay a sum equivalent to, or perhaps 
much greater than, a fine in a criminal case without any of the 
protection afforded by the special procedure of the criminal 
courts. It was also wrong that such a sum should go as a windfall 
to the plaintiff. It was beyond the power of the Law Lords to 
abolish punitive damages entirely, but they said that in future 
they should be limited to two classes of case at common law — 
when there was unconstitutional action by servants of the govern-
ment, or when the action of the defendant was calculated to 
make a profit for himself which would exceed any damages a 
court might order him to pay to the plaintiff. 
1 Ley v. Hamilton (1935) 153 L . T . 384, 386. 
2 [1934] 50 T . L . R . 581. 
3 Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada 7 Me . 202 (1867). 
4 [1964] A . C . 1129. 
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It will be seen that this distinguishes between two cases — 
the first emphasizes mainly the defendant's position, the second 
more the nature or quality of his conduct. This is not the occasion 
to discuss the value of this distinction, or even to wonder whether 
the whole attempt to delimit the scope of punitive damages is not 
mistaken. But it is clear that the Lords have at least conceded 
that there may still be cases in which the defendant may have to 
be hit really hard in his bank balance in order to show him that 
he should not do things like that in England. I wish merely to 
discuss the narrower question, when are such damages permissible 
in libel? 
It is, I suppose, possible that a disgraceful libel might be 
published by a servant of the government so as to fall within the 
first category, but such cases are so rare that they may be ignored. 
But what is the position of a newspaper whose circulation 
increases after it has published a libel on some well-known 
person? Is it to be at risk for punitive damages, as one, rather 
literal, interpretation, might suggest. The question has been 
discussed in three cases since 1963 — McCarej v. Associated Press,1 
Broadway Approvals Ltd v. Odhams Press Ltd2 and Manson v. 
Associated Newspapers Ltd3 — the first two in the Court of Appeal, 
and the third at first instance before Widgery J . These cases 
make two points plain. First, the mere fact that circulation 
increases after a libel will not imperil a newspaper's position. 
Punitive damages should be awarded only if there is real evidence 
of a wicked and callous attempt to increase circulation at the cost 
of the plaintiff's reputation. In Manson the judge said that 'a cold 
and cynical calculation of profit and loss was required'. This 
seems to go further than Lord Devlin himself, and to impose a 
very heavy burden of proof on a plaintiff. Indeed, the evidence 
which is available about the workings of Fleet Street suggests 
that careful calculations are not much favoured : rough and ready 
approximations are rather the order of the day. 
Secondly, a distinction must be drawn between aggravated 
compensatory damages on the one hand and punitive damages on 
the other. Compensatory damages may be inflamed or aggravated 
1 [1965] 2 Q . B . 86. 
2 [1965] i W . L . R . 805. 
3 [1965] i W . L . R . 1038. 
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by the wounding and insulting circumstances surrounding the 
publication of the libel. But the jury is not now entitled, save in 
the two exceptional cases, to add an additional slice of money on 
top of the compensatory amount in order to punish the defendant. 
As it was put in one sentence by Davies L . J . , in Broadway 
Approvals,1 there is a difference between conduct which shocks 
or wounds the plaintiff and conduct which shocks the jury. 
Now if the power to award aggravated compensatory damages 
is combined with the old principle that a jury's award is within 
very wide limits unquestionable it may be thought that there is 
not really much room left for punitive damages anyway. That is 
what Lord Devlin himself thought in 1964. But this assumption 
has been seriously weakened by these more recent cases which 
also display a determination to equate awards for libel with 
those for personal injuries. Now if the maximum award for libel 
in future is to be in the £20-30 thousand bracket, which is 
roughly the maximum for serious personal injuries, then it must 
be asked whether this sum is sufficient to deter an arrogant and 
powerful defendant. May there not be newspapers which are 
making money so fast, or even losing it so quickly, that no ordinary 
commercial calculations are relevant to their decision to publish 
a gross libel on some public figure ? 
The whole matter has been discussed in an interesting recent 
case in the High Court of Australia, Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons 
Pty Ltd.2 The plaintiff was a Federal M.P . in Australia. He 
sued two newspapers, the Sun-Herald and the Sunday Telegraph, for 
libel. In each newspaper the alleged libel was given great promi-
nence. It was an allegation that the plaintiff had some link with a 
well-known Russian spy, and had been duped by that spy to ask 
parliamentary questions about defence establishments. The 
allegation was not merely quite untrue but had been published 
recklessly and arrogantly. The defendants did not contest 
liability but fought the case purely on damages. The trial judge 
told the jury that they were entitled to award punitive damages. 
The jury returned with a verdict for £13,000, no distinction being 
made in that total sum between compensatory and punitive 
damages. 
1 [1965] i W . L . R . 805,822. 
2 (1966) 40 A . L . J . R . 124. 
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In a second action, Uren sued two more newspapers for four 
more distinct libels. The appeal in the second action was heard 
at the same time as the appeal in the first action. Two of the 
four libels in the second action simply repeated the allegation 
made by the Sun-Herald in the first action that the plaintiff had 
links with a spy. On these counts the jury awarded the plaintiff 
£15,000. The other two libels were quite different. One alleged 
that the plaintiff was one of a 'divided, warring, rag-tag and bob-
tail outfit' which 'would have difficulty in running a raffle for a 
duck in a hotel on a Saturday afternoon, let alone running a 
country'. The jury's award of £5,000 for this was set aside on 
appeal as absurdly excessive. The fourth libel commented on the 
plaintiff's parliamentary record and suggested that in some way 
he was pro-communist. The jury's award of £10,000 for this was 
also set aside as extravagant. 
The real question in both appeals was the award of punitive 
damages for the two libels alleging contacts with a spy, for which 
the plaintiff had received £13,000 and £15,000 respectively. The 
High Court of Australia unanimously refused to follow Lord 
Devlin's opinion in Rookes v. Barnard. It held that in Australia 
punitive damages might properly be awarded when there had 
been an insolent vindictive, outrageous or high-handed dis-
regard of the plaintiff's rights. ('Contumelious' was the particular 
adjective favoured by the Court.) On the other hand, the Court 
held, though with two dissentients, that in neither action were the 
circumstances such as to entitle the jury to award punitive as 
distinct from compensatory damages. The Court's disagreement 
with Lord Devlin was at bottom based on the simple ground 
that it was hard to see why the law should treat more favourably 
libels published with the utmost spite, arrogance and ill will than 
those published after a cold-blooded calculation of the likely 
profit to be gained from them. Many people will find this per-
suasive. There are well-known examples of men in public posi-
tions being harried or hounded by a newspaper in a way which 
strongly suggests spite or malice on the part of the owner or 
editor of the paper. It is true that the Press Council (of which, by a 
coincidence, Lord Devlin became chairman when he retired from 
the bench) will discourage conduct of this kind. But an arrogant 
newspaper might disregard the Press Council. Now until recently 
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it would have been unthinkable for the High Court of Australia 
not to have followed a decision of the House of Lords. But the 
Court has achieved a remarkable reputation throughout the world 
for the depth of learning and analytical skill displayed in its 
judgments, in particular in those of Sir Owen Dixon the recently 
retired Chief Justice. In some indefinable way, an Australian 
judgment gives the reader the feeling that the last word on the 
subject has been said for a generation. 
In March 1967 the Court of Appeal delivered a judgment1 
that illustrates vividly the difference between the English and the 
Australian approach. The Plaintiff, Mr Harold Fielding, was a 
well-known impressario. Mr Fielding and the Company which he 
controlled produced a very successful musical, 'Charlie Gir l ' . 
The box office receipts were an all-time record for the theatre. 
The Defendants who knew these facts nevertheless published in 
their theatrical weekly Variety, that has a world-wide circulation, 
a statement that 'Charlie Gir l ' was a 'disastrous flop'. When Mr 
Fielding protested the Editor roared with laughter and said 'It's 
nothing, Fielding'. The paper never apologized. When Mr 
Fielding and his Company sued, the paper did not even take the 
trouble to defend the action on the issue of liability. With judicial 
restraint Lord Denning said the paper 'had behaved very badly 
indeed'. What damages should a defendant like this be made to 
pay? 
This question had to be answered in the Fielding case, not by a 
jury of laymen but by a Queen's Bench Master, of very great 
experience and ability. (A Master might be described as a sub-
ordinate Judge.) He awarded Mr Fielding £5,000 and his Com-
pany £10,000. The Court of Appeal after referring to the dif-
ference between Rookes v. Barnard and Uren v. Fairfax decided it 
must reduce the awards to a total of £1,600, a cut of nearly 
90 per cent. 
More recently the Court of Appeal has reviewed the whole topic 
of exemplary damages in Broome v. Casse// and Co. Ftd. and Irving? 
The second defendant, David Irving, described by Phillimore, 
L . J . , as 'a grasping, conceited and foolish young man', wrote, 
1 [1967] 2 Q.B . 841. 
2 [197T] 2 Q.B . 354. 
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and the first defendants published, a book entitled The Destruction
of Convqy P.Q. I7. The book contained the gravest libels on the
plaintiff, a retired naval offer, accusing him of cowardice and
disobedience to orders when he had been in command of the
convoy. The defendants did not go into the witness box, and did
not attempt to justify the really serious parts of the libel. After the
first defendants had been served with a writ for libel in respect of
the distribution of 60 proof copies they released the hard-back
edition to the public. Lord Justice Salmon said: 'It seems obvious
to me that they took the risk with their eyes open, judging that
they would make more money out of the book than the money
which any libel action would be likely to cost them.'
The Court of Appeal held that under the rules laid down by
Lord Devlin the jury were entitled to award the plaintiff £40,000
damages, made up of £15,000 compensatory, and £25,000
exemplary, damages. But the Court also said that the rules in
Rookes v. Barnard gave rise to so many difficulties that the decision
itself should not be followed. The question whether the Court of
Appeal can, or should, make such a pronouncement about a
decision of the House of Lords is now itself under appeal to the
House.
Moon-night
Translation from Ttl Fu (Ch'ang-an, Fall, 756)
Moon of tonight upon Fu Chou
In the women's quarters she watches alone,
Far away, I pity the small boy, and the girls
Who do not know or remember the Capital -
In a sweet mist her hair-clouds moisten
In the pure glitter her jade arms are chill
When shall we leaning by the curtained void
Shine on each other, our tear-streaks dry?
DAVID LATTIMORE
